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ABSTRACT
The landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Indalex Ltd. dealt
with many issues, including both the treatment of a deemed trust prescribed
under the Ontario Pension Benefits Act (“PBA”) in the context of insolvency
proceedings under the Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act (“CCAA”), and the
fiduciary duty owed by a debtor company in its dual role as employer sponsor
and administrator of pension plans. This paper analyzes and critiques the
court’s handling of these two issues, arguing that the court’s holding that the
PBA deemed trust continues to apply under the CCAA (subject to the doctrine
of federal paramountcy) represents a departure from its prior decisions, raises
troubling policy implications, and calls into question established jurisprudence
on a related issue in Canadian insolvency law. In addition, this paper shows
that the five justices who formed the majority in the result did not formulate a
unified approach to ascertaining the nature and scope of the fiduciary duty of
an employer-administrator of pension plans, though they were in agreement
that the insolvent company’s decision to commence proceedings under the
CCAA in and of itself did not create a conflict between the company’s self
interest and its fiduciary duty as plan administrator. Finally, this paper argues
that the interplay between the court’s holdings on the two issues leads to a legal
contradiction for employer-administrators that are insolvent or nearing
insolvency.
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Since its release, the Supreme Court of Canada’s (the “SCC”) decision in Re
Indalex Ltd.1 has engendered extensive commentary by practitioners and scholars
of insolvency law in Canada. An extraordinarily complex decision that is situated
at the confluence of pension law, insolvency law and fiduciary law, Indalex dealt
with four main issues, as follows:
I.

Does the deemed trust provided for in s. 57(4) of the Ontario Pension
Benefits Act2 (“PBA”) (the “PBA deemed trust”) apply to wind-up
deficiencies?

II.

If so, does the deemed trust supersede the debtor-in-possession
(“DIP”) charge?

III.

Did the debtor, Indalex Limited (“Indalex”) owe any fiduciary
obligations to the members of its pension plans when making
decisions in the context of the insolvency proceedings?

IV.

Did the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “ONCA”) properly exercise
its discretion in imposing a constructive trust to remedy the breaches
of fiduciary duties?3

The seven justices who heard the case produced three separate sets of
written reasons: Justice Deschamps penned the reasons for judgment on behalf
of herself and Justice Moldaver; Justice Cromwell wrote concurring reasons on
behalf of himself, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Rothstein; and Justice
LeBel issued dissenting reasons with Justice Abella concurring. On issue I, the
dissent agreed with Justice Deschamps in answering in the affirmative, while
Justice Cromwell disagreed. All seven justices unanimously answered issue II in
the negative and the issue III in the affirmative, though for significantly different
reasons. With respect to issue IV, the five-member majority were in agreement
that the answer was no, while Justice LeBel and Justice Abella disagreed.

Re Indalex Ltd., 2013 SCC 6, 1 SCR 271 [Indalex (SCC)].
Pension Benefits Act, RSO 1990, c P8.
3 Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 25.
1
2
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This paper focuses on issues II and III stated above. On issue II, the SCC
in Indalex held that the PBA deemed trust continues to apply in the context of
proceedings under the Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act4 (“CCAA”), subject to
the doctrine of federal paramountcy.5 This paper argues that this represents a
departure from the SCC’s prior decisions where the court treated the CCAA and
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act6 (“BIA”) as having a consistent scheme for
determining priorities in insolvency proceedings. Such a departure is troubling
from a public policy perspective, because inconsistent treatment of priorities
under the twin insolvency regimes would create skewed incentives against
reorganizing under the CCAA, to the detriment of the CCAA’s legislative
objectives. Moreover, the holding calls into question the existing case law on the
related legal issue of under what circumstances the stay of proceedings under the
CCAA should be lifted to permit creditors to petition a debtor into bankruptcy.
With respect to issue III, this paper examines the fiduciary duty of a plan
administrator both at common law and as prescribed by the PBA. The facts of
the Indalex case challenged the SCC to re-fashion the law of fiduciary duty in order
to properly apprehend the nature and scope of the fiduciary duty of Indalex that
acted as both the employer sponsor and the administrator of its pension plans—
a dual role commonly referred to as “employer-administrator”. Justice
Deschamps and Justice Cromwell articulated two somewhat different approaches
in their written reasons, but they and their respective concurring justices were in
agreement that Indalex’s decision to pursue restructuring under the CCAA in and
of itself did not create a conflict between the company’s self-interest and its
fiduciary duty as plan administrator.
Beyond analyzing and critiquing two of the SCC’s holdings in Indalex, this
paper considers the interplay between these holdings and concludes that the two
holdings lead to a legal contradiction regarding whether an employeradministrator is permitted to commence insolvency proceedings under the
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36, as amended.
Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 52 and 242.
6 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3.
4
5
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CCAA without first winding up its pension plans. The resolution of this
contradiction may require legislative amendment or regulatory oversight aimed at
providing courts with clearer guidance on the proper balancing of the interests of
various stakeholders in the context of corporate insolvency.

Indalex was a wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary of the US-based company,
Indalex Holding Corp (“Indalex US”).7 The Indalex group operated an aluminum
extrusion business in North America.8 On 3 April, 2009, Indalex filed for
protection under the CCAA.9 At the time, Indalex was the employeradministrator of two defined benefit pension plans.10 The plan for Indalex’s
salaried employees was in the process of being wound up11, while the other, for
certain former executives, was closed to new entrants but not yet in wind-up.12
When Indalex initiated the CCAA proceedings, both plans had funding
deficiencies calculated on a wind-up basis.13
Less than a week after Indalex sought protection from its creditors by
applying for a stay under the CCAA, the company persuaded the CCAA judge,
Justice Morawetz to grant a court order approving a DIP financing loan.14 The
order granted, in favour of the DIP lenders, a super-priority status over all existing
debt and other claims. Subsequently, Indalex and Indalex US pursued a sale of all
of their assets on a going-concern basis under a court-approved process. They
received only one bid, whereby the bidder would not assume the debtor
companies’ pension liabilities.15 The debtor companies then brought motions for
a court order approving the bid and directing the sale proceeds to be paid to the
DIP lenders. Indalex’s pension plan members opposed the proposed distribution
Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 3.
Ibid.
9 Ibid at para 3. Indalex US had already filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in Delaware in March 2009.
10 Ibid at para 5.
11 Ibid. The effective date of the wind up was 31 December 2006.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid at para 6.
14 Ibid at para 9.
15 Ibid at para 13 and 14.
7
8
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to the DIP lenders; they argued that their claims—that is, the funding deficiencies
in the pension plans—were deemed to be held in trust pursuant to s.57(4) of the
PBA, and therefore ranked in priority to the claims of the DIP lenders.16

After the going-concern sale of the Canadian business, a priority dispute
ensued between the pension plan members—who relied on the deemed trust
provisions under the Ontario PBA—and the DIP lenders—who held a superpriority charge granted by Justice Morawetz. The SCC unanimously sided with
the latter. Their reasoning proceeded in two steps. First, the CCAA does not
expressly provide for all of the priorities set out in the BIA, and courts may not
read BIA priorities into the CCAA at will.17 Hence, priorities created under
provincial legislation, such as the PBA deemed trust, continue to apply in CCAA
proceedings subject to the doctrine of federal paramountcy.18 Second, a courtordered priority has the same effect as a statutory priority.19 Applying this
reasoning to the facts, the Court found the DIP charge superseded the PBA
deemed trust on the basis that the latter was incompatible with and frustrated the
purpose of the court-ordered DIP charge pursuant to the doctrine of federal
paramountcy.20
The first step of the above analysis necessarily implies that the CCAA and
the BIA need not be consistent with respect to priority rules. Such an implication
flies in the face of pre-Indalex case law21 which treated the BIA as setting out a
Ibid at para 14.
Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 51.
18 Ibid at para 52-53.
19 Ibid at para 60.
20 Ibid at para 54-60.
21 Continental Casualty Co v MacLeod-Stedman Inc, [1996] M.J No 551, 43 CBR (3d) 211 (CA); British ColumBIA v
Henfrey Samson Belair Ltd, [1989] 2 SCR 24 [Henfrey]; and General Chemical Canada Ltd (Re), [2007] OJ No
3296, 2007 ONCA 600, including the lower court decision at [2006] OJ No. 3087, 22 CBR (5th) 298 (SCJ),
leave to appeal refused [2007] SCCA No 539 (SCC). See also GE Canada Equipment Financing GP v Northern
Sawills Inc, [2012] OJ No 5633, 2012 ONSC 6664 and Everingham Brothers Ltd (Re), [1999] OJ No 774, 43
OR (3d) 594 (CA).
16
17
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complete code of priority rules that occupied the whole legislative field and
rendered all statutory deemed trusts ineffective, with the exceptions of those
deemed trusts which have all the common law attributes of trusts and those that
are set out in s.67(3) of the BIA. The leading authority predating Indalex is the
2010 decision in Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General)22. In that case, the
SCC considered whether the statutory deemed trust in respect of GST
remittances continued to apply in CCAA proceedings. The majority answered in
the negative on the basis that the twin insolvency regimes were “in harmony”23
and shared a “point of convergence”24 with respect to priorities. Justice
Deschamps, writing for the majority in Century Services, stated:
Because the CCAA is silent about what happens if reorganization fails,
the BIA scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the
backdrop for what will happen if a CCAA reorganization is ultimately
unsuccessful.25

In Indalex, Justice Deschamps downplayed the significance of the foregoing
statement from Century Services, instead emphasizing that creditors’ rights under
the BIA “remain only shadows until bankruptcy occurs,” so that “at the end of a
CCAA liquidation proceeding, priorities may be determined by the PPSA’s
scheme rather than the federal scheme set out in the BIA.”26 This
acknowledgement of the inconsistency between the two federal insolvency
regimes not only creates troubling policy implications, but also constitutes a
departure from the pre-Indalex jurisprudence.

Inconsistency in priority treatment under the CCAA and the BIA is
troubling from a public policy perspective. If a claim retained priority under one
insolvency regime but not under the other, the claimant would have incentives to
Re Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd., 2010 SCC 60, 3 SCR 379 [Century Services].
Century Services, supra note 22 at para 45.
24 Ibid at para 23.
25 Ibid.
26 Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 52.
22
23
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subject the debtor to that regime which would recognize the claimant’s priority.
The majority in Century Services recognized that such incentives could be created.27
Indeed, they considered it a key factor influencing the outcome of the case: if the
Crown’s GST deemed trust retained priority under the CCAA, secured creditors
would have “skewed incentives against reorganizing under the CCAA”28 and
would prematurely petition the debtor into bankruptcy in order to subvert the
Crown’s priority. The majority denounced such opportunistic behaviour as
“statute shopping” that “can only undermine the [CCAA’s] remedial objectives,”
namely, to avoid the social and economic costs of liquidation on bankruptcy.29
The same policy argument ought to be equally applicable to the facts of Indalex:
if $300,000 in unremitted GST was sufficient to incentivize statute shopping,
surely a PBA deemed trust to the tune of millions of dollars would have more
pronounced effects.
While the SCC in Indalex made no attempt to justify the inconsistent
approach to priority treatment under the twin insolvency regimes from a policy
perspective, there are two potential justifications for such an approach. The first
posits that the adverse effects caused by the “skewed incentives” on the part of
the secured creditors should not be overblown given the fact that restructuring
under the CCAA is a debtor-driven process. The debtor company is usually the
party applying for CCAA protection at the initial hearing, and, moreover, the
debtor may decide to make such application without notice to any person
interested in the matter. Section 11 of the CCAA gives courts discretion to grant
the initial order on an ex parte basis. Accordingly, the secured creditors might not
exert the same degree of influence on the debtor’s course of action in
restructuring as the SCC suggested in Century Services.
This first justification is flawed in that it ignores the practical reality of
corporate restructuring. A recent article by two leading insolvency practitioners

Century Services, supra note 22 at para 47.
Ibid.
29 Ibid.
27
28
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illustrates this practical reality.30 Often, a debtor company commences the CCAA
proceeding with the goal of effecting a sale of the debtor company—a strategy
commonly known as a “liquidating CCAA”—after having already started
soliciting offers for a going-concern sale of its business.31 In fact, the preliminary
sales efforts undertaken by the debtor company are likely to be the reason for
which a secured creditor agrees to “forbear on enforcing its security.”32 The
authors also point out that by the time a debtor company is considering a courtsupervised insolvency process, it will have already entered into discussions with
its secured creditors regarding the various restructuring or liquidation options.33
Moreover, the judicial test for determining the appropriateness of an initial
CCAA order is whether the debtor has “a germ of a reasonable and realistic
plan;”34 accordingly, whether the secured creditors support or are opposed to the
debtor’s application for CCAA protection is a material factor that the judge
presiding over the initial hearing will consider.35
The second potential rationale that could be advanced to downplay the
importance of curbing secured creditors’ incentives for statute shopping asserts
that efforts to curb the skewed incentives are unlikely to affect the outcome.
Secured creditors’ preferred alternative to the CCAA process is to have a receiver
appointed under the BIA to effect a going-concern sale of the debtor’s business,
thereby achieving the same outcome as a liquidating CCAA process. This
argument is also flawed, because it relies on an implicit assumption that
liquidation on a going-concern basis is the only or ideal outcome attainable in the
CCAA proceedings. Professor Roderick Wood of the University of Alberta
observes that the CCAA restructuring regime was originally designed with the
goal of enabling insolvent corporations to develop a plan of compromise or
arrangement that would gain the approval of its creditor body.36 Though in recent
Michelle Grant and Tevia R. M. Jeffries, “Having Jumped Off the Cliffs, When Liquidating Why Choose
CCAA over Receivership (or vice versa)?”, in Janis Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2013 (Toronto:
Thomson Carswell, 2014) at 325.
31 Ibid at 343.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Alberta Treasury Branches v Tallgrass Energy Corp, 2013 ABQB 432, AWLD 4492 (Alta QB) [Tallgrass] at para 14
and 18.
35 Grant and Jeffries, supra note 30 at 344.
36 Roderick J. Wood, “Rescue and Liquidation in Restructuring Law”, 53 Can Bus LJ (2012) 407, at 411.
30
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years the CCAA has increasingly been used to effect asset sales, “we cannot
conclude from this alone that the traditional restructuring [process by way of a
plan of compromise or arrangement] is on the road to extinction.”37 Using the
CCAA process to effect a sale of the debtor company does not always benefit all
creditors. Secured creditors will support the sale as long as the expected proceeds
are sufficient to cover their claims, even if it may not maximize recovery by other
creditors.

Indalex calls into question the existing case law on the issue of under what
circumstances a CCAA stay of proceedings should be lifted to permit petitions
into bankruptcy to proceed. Pre-Indalex, the leading authority was Re Ivaco Inc.38
There, Justice Farley granted the creditors’ motion to petition the debtor
companies into bankruptcy on two grounds. First, “[o]ne of the primary purposes
of a bankruptcy proceeding is to secure an equitable distribution of the debtor’s
property amongst the creditors.”39 Second, the debtor companies had sold all of
their operational assets and were “essentially in a distribution of proceeds
mode.”40 Justice Farley acknowledged that the creditors’ motive was to enhance
their position by taking advantage of the BIA priority scheme which would give
them priority over the pension claims. Nonetheless, Justice Farley and the
ONCA, who later affirmed his decision, were satisfied that Parliament chose the
BIA, rather than the CCAA, as the regime under which to effect a distribution of
debtor’s property, including the proceeds of a liquidating CCAA.41
Indalex casts doubt on the holding in Re Ivaco Inc to the extent that the SCC
now regards the CCAA as recognizing provincial priorities, subject to
Ibid at 408.
Re Ivaco Inc. (2006), 56 CCPB 1, 83 OR (3d) 108 (Ont CA); affirming (2005), 47 CCPB 62 (Ont SCJ
[Commercial List]) [Ivaco].
39 Ibid at para 13.
40 Ibid at para 18.
41 Ibid at para 76.
37
38

146

PENSION, INSOLVENCY AND FIDUCIARY LAW

Vol. 25

reprioritization by way of court-ordered super-priority charges. Post-Indalex, a
new issue that arises at the end of a liquidating CCAA becomes: should courts
order an immediate distribution of proceeds under the CCAA, or lift the CCAA
stay to effect a distribution under the BIA? Judicial determination of this issue
can have a dramatic effect on the rights of vulnerable claimants, such as pension
plan members, especially where the proceeds of sale are insufficient to satisfy
secured creditors’ claims. Is such a determination properly within the jurisdiction
of the courts? It is tempting to answer “yes” by drawing a parallel with the judicial
discretion of CCAA courts to grant super-priority charges in favour of critical
suppliers or DIP lenders. However, this parallel is flawed. Whereas the superpriority charges in favour of critical suppliers or DIP lenders can be justified by
reference to the CCAA’s remedial objective of facilitating debtor companies’
reorganization and avoiding the social and economic costs of bankruptcy, the
choice between two alternative sets of priority rules for the distribution of sale
proceeds cannot rely on this reasoning.
The recent case of Grant Forest Products Inc. v G.E. Canada Leasing Services Co.42
has not clarified the issue. Justice Campbell granted the motion brought by
second lien lenders to lift the CCAA stay in order to petition the debtor
companies into bankruptcy.43 Despite referencing Indalex, Justice Campbell did
not apply the SCC’s holding in Indalex that provincial priorities may be applied to
determine distribution in a liquidating CCAA proceeding. Such a holding should
have even more force on the facts in Grant Forest than in Indalex, as there was no
court-ordered super-priority prior to the asset sale. Nonetheless, Justice Campbell
distinguished Indalex on the grounds that the pension plans of GFPI44 were not
being wound up when the initial order was granted and thus could not have the
benefit of the PBA deemed trust.45 Consequently, it remains unclear whether a
PBA deemed trust that is effective under the CCAA and not subverted by any
court-ordered super-priority may receive payment prior to a bankruptcy order
being granted.
Grant Forest Products Inc. v G.E. Canada Leasing Services Co. 2013 ONSC 5933, 7 CCPB (2nd) 239 (Ont SCJ)
[Commercial List] [Grant Forest].
43 Ibid at para 127.
44 Grant Forest Products Inc., the debtor company.
45 Grant Forest, supra note 42 at para 46.
42
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As analyzed above, the SCC’s resolution of the priority dispute in Indalex
exhibits shortcomings. The inconsistencies with its own prior jurisprudence,
coupled with the attendant public policy concerns, justify a call for the highest
court in the land to revisit the issue, with a view to improving the functioning of
Canada’s twin insolvency regimes.

In opposing Indalex’s motion to seek court approval of the liquidating
CCAA sale, the pension plan members contended that Indalex had breached the
fiduciary duty it owed to them in its capacity as the plan administrator.46 This
issue can be parsed into three sub-issues: (1) whether a pension administrator
owes a fiduciary duty to the members of its pension plan, (2) what is the content
of such fiduciary duty, and (3) whether Indalex acted in breach of such fiduciary
duty in the course of the CCAA proceedings.

Well-recognized categories of fiduciary relationships exist at common law,
including trustee-beneficiary, director-company, and solicitor-client relationships.
These categories are not closed and courts can recognize relationships in novel
fact settings as attracting fiduciary obligations.47 In Frame v Smith48, Justice Wilson
set forth three indicia of a fiduciary relationship:
(1) the fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power;
(2) the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as
to effect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests; and

Indalex Ltd., Re, 2011 ONCA 265, 331 DLR (4th) 352, [Indalex (ONCA)] at para 76.
Anthony Duggan, “Fiduciary Obligations in the Supreme Court of Canada: A Retrospective”, 50 Can Bus
LJ 453 (2011) at 453.
48 Frame v Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99, 42 DLR (4th) 81.
46
47

148

PENSION, INSOLVENCY AND FIDUCIARY LAW

Vol. 25

(3) the beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the
fiduciary holding the discretion or power.49

In Burke v Hudson’s Bay Co.50, the SCC held that “there is no doubt that” the
three indicia were found in the relationship between the pension plan
administrator and the employees/beneficiaries under the pension plan.51 Both
ONCA and the SCC in Indalex cited Burke as binding authority when finding that
Indalex owed a fiduciary duty to its pension plan members.52

At common law, a fiduciary owes the principal a number of specific duties,
including: a duty of loyalty and good faith, commonly formulated as a
requirement to act solely in the best interests of the principal;53 a duty to avoid
any actual or perceived conflict of interest;54 a duty of even-handedness requiring
the fiduciary to treat each beneficiary or class of beneficiaries impartially;55 and a
duty to disclose “material information sufficient to permit a beneficiary to make
a fully informed decision.”56 Where the fiduciary is given the powers to manage
property on behalf of the principal, the fiduciary’s conduct is measured by
reference to what an ordinary prudent person would do when managing his or
her own property.57
While Burke established that a plan administrator is a fiduciary vis-à-vis plan
beneficiaries at common law, the plan administrator is not subject to all of the
common law duties mentioned above. The SCC in Burke determined the content
of a plan administrator’s fiduciary duties based on a close reading of the terms of
Ibid at 99 (DLR).
Burke v Hudson’s Bay Co., 2010 SCC 34, 2 SCR 273 [Burke].
51 Ibid at para 41.
52 Indalex (ONCA), supra note 46 at 117; Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at 62.
53 Ari Kaplan and Mitch Frazer, Pension Law, 2nd Edition (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2013) at 323.
54 Ibid at 324.
55 Ibid at 331.
56 Ibid at 334.
57 Ibid at 321.
49
50
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the pension plan documentation as well as the governing pension legislation.58
The provisions of the plan documentation did not give the employees of
Hudson’s Bay Company (“HBC”) any equitable interest in the actuarial surplus
in the pension fund. Thus, the Court held that HBC did not breach its fiduciary
duty of even-handedness by not transferring a portion of the actuarial surplus to
the acquiror of HBC’s sold division for the benefit of those employees who were
transferred to the acquiror. Writing on behalf of a unanimous court, Justice
Rothstein stated:
The duty of even-handedness must be anchored in the terms of the
pension plan documentation. It does not operate in a vacuum … [J]ust
because HBC has fiduciary duties as plan administrator does not
obligate it under any purported duty of even-handedness to confer
benefits upon one class of employees to which they have no right
under the plan.59

If a plan administrator’s duty of even-handedness is contextualized based on
the plan terms, it raises the related question of whether the duty of loyalty or the
duty to avoid conflicts of interest are similarly contextualized. The ONCA in
Indalex indicate they are not; after citing Burke, Justice Gillese remarked, “Thus,
at common law, Indalex as the Plan’s administrator owed a fiduciary duty to the
Plan’s members and beneficiaries to act in their best interests.”60
The phrase “act in [the] best interests” is commonly used to refer to the duty
of loyalty which is “the distinctive and defining feature of fiduciary
relationships”61 in private law. For example, the phrase is used in corporate
statutes to impose a fiduciary duty on corporate directors and officers.62
However, the ONCA’s use of this phrase alone to define the content of Indalex’s
Burke, supra note 50 at paras 61-82.
Burke, supra note 50 at para 85.
60 Indalex (ONCA), supra note 46 at para 119.
61 Lionel Smith, “Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgment on Behalf of Another”,
130 LQR (2014) 608.
62 For example, s.122(a) of the Canada Business Corporations Act provides, “Every director and officer of a
corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties shall (a) act honestly and in good faith
with a view to the best interests of the corporation […].”
58
59
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fiduciary duty as plan administrator effectively stretches the holding in Burke
beyond its intended limit. By contrast, Justice Cromwell, in his concurring
opinion in Indalex, adopted a view more consistent with the Burke decision.
Recognizing that "fiduciary duties do not exist at large, but arise from and relate
to the specific legal interests at stake,”63 he ascertained the nature and scope of
Indalex’s fiduciary duty “in the legal framework governing the relationship out of
which the fiduciary duty arises.”64 By “legal framework”, he meant the plan
documents and the provisions of the PBA relating to pension administration.65
The statutory duties of an administrator are examined below.

Under the Ontario PBA, a pension plan administrator has two basic
statutory functions. Pursuant to s. 19(1) of the PBA, the administrator shall
ensure that the pension plan and fund are administered in accordance with the
PBA and the regulations.66 Section 19(3) provides that the administrator shall
ensure that the pension plan and fund are administered in accordance with the
terms of the plan.67 Additionally, s. 19(4) provides that s. 19(3) does not enable
the administrator to administer the pension plan contrary to the PBA and the
regulations.68 Accordingly, where a conflict arises between the plan terms and the
statutory requirements, the latter will prevail. This rule gives effect to the principle
that the PBA is minimum standards legislation that sets out “a statutory ‘floor’
beneath which a pension plan’s terms may not fall.”69 Moreover, employers and
employees are permitted to contract for “enhanced pension benefits greater than
the minimum standards set forth in the PBA.”70
In addition to the two statutory functions discussed above, the PBA imposes
on an administrator a number of specific obligations, including the following:
Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 185.
Ibid at para 186.
65 Ibid at para 187.
66 PBA, supra note 2, s. 19(1).
67 Ibid, s. 19(3).
68 Ibid, s. 19(4).
69 Kaplan and Frazer, supra note 53.
70 Smiley v Ontario (Pension Board) (1994), 116 DLR (4th) 337, 6 CCPB 166, at 343 (Ont Gen Div) [Smiley].
63
64
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s. 22(1) requires the administrator to “exercise the care, diligence and
skill in the administration and investment of the pension fund that a
person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the
property of another person”;71



s. 22(4) prohibits the administrator from “knowingly permit the
administrator’s interest to conflict with the administrator’s duties and
powers in respect of the pension fund”; 72



ss. 22(9) and 22.1(1) prohibits the administrator from receiving “any
benefit from the pension plan other than pension benefits, ancillary
benefits and a refund of contributions” and “reasonable fees and
expenses relating to the administration of the pension plan and the
administration and investment of the pension fund; 73



ss. 25 and 26 prescribe disclosure requirements regarding
eligible/required plan members and proposed plan amendments,
respectively;74



s. 56(1) requires the administrator “ensure that all contributions are
paid when due”;75 and



where an employer does not pay all contributions when due, the
administrator must notify the Superintendent pursuant to s. 56(2) of
the PBA and s. 6.1 of the general regulations76, and s. 59 of the PBA
permits the administrator to commence court proceedings to obtain
such payment.77

A comparison of these statutory duties with the fiduciary duties at common
law discussed earlier reveals two important observations. First, many of the
statutory duties resemble but are not identical to the common law fiduciary duties.
For example, the standard of care set out in s. 22(1) is similar but not identical to
the common law standard of care. Though both use an “ordinary prudent
PBA, supra note 2, s. 22(1).
Ibid, s. 22(4).
73 Ibid, ss. 22(9) and 22.1(1).
74 Ibid, ss. 25 and 26.
75 Ibid, s. 56(1).
76 Ibid, s. 56(2); General, RRO 1990, Reg 909, s. 6.1.
77 Ibid, s. 59.
71
72
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person” test, the statutory standard considers how an ordinary prudent person
would act when dealing with the property of another person. In contrast, the
common law standard considers how the ordinary prudent person would act
when dealing with her own property. This divergence has led to a general
recognition that pension plan administrators are subject to a higher standard of
care than the common law standard.78 Likewise, the conflict-of-interest
prohibition under s. 22(4) differs from the corresponding duty at common law
with respect to the knowledge qualifier.
The second observation is that the Ontario PBA does not expressly
prescribe a duty of loyalty. Indeed, the words “loyalty” and “best interests” do
not appear at all in the Act. The same is true for the pension legislation in New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Manitoba. In contrast, the federal Pension Benefits
Standards Act79 (“PBSA”) as well as five provincial pension statutes expressly
require administrators to act in the best interests of pension plan members.80 It is
beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the legislative intent behind the
absence of a duty of loyalty provision in the Ontario PBA. Nonetheless, the
discrepancies as identified above between the common law fiduciary duties and
the statutory duties imposed by the PBA raise an interesting question: namely,
whether the latter are meant to displace or supplement the former as the legal
framework governing the relationship between plan administrators and plan
members. This question is brought into a sharper focus in the context of
employer-sponsored administration of pension plans.

Subsection 8(1)(a) of the Ontario PBA expressly permits an employer to act
as the administrator of its pension plan.81 A corporation that plays the dual role
as employer-administrator attracts concerns about conflicts of interest for the
Kaplan and Frazer, supra note 53 at 322. See also: Lloyd v Imperial Oil Ltd, 2008 ABQB 379 at para 57, 68.
Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, RSC 1985, c 32 (2nd Supp).
80 PBSA, supra note 80, s.8(10)(b); Alberta (AEPPA, s.35(3)); British Columbia (BCPBSA, s.8(5);
Newfoundland and Labrador (NLPBA, s.17(3)(b)); Quebec (QSPPA, s.151); Saskatchewan (SPBA,
11(2)(c)).
81 PBA, supra note 2, s.8(1)(a).
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simple reason that the employer’s own interests do not always align perfectly with
the interests of the plan beneficiaries. This raises the question of whether a
fundamental tension exists between s. 8(1)(a) and s. 22(1)(4), and to what extent
the conflict, if any, affects the content of an employer-administrator’s fiduciary
duty to plan members.
Prior to Indalex, the leading case on these questions82 was a decision by the
Pension Commission of Ontario (“PCO”). In Imperial Oil Ltd v Ontario
(Superintendent of Pension),83 an employer amended its pension plans for efficiency
reasons, thereby denying employees enhanced early retirement annuities unless
they would have been eligible to retire within five years of termination of
employment. A group of employees challenged the amendment on the grounds
that the employer, acting in its dual role as employer-administrator, was in conflict
and acted to the detriment of the employees’ interests contrary to s. 22(4) of the
PBA.84 The PCO rejected the employees’ argument and set forth three
propositions comprising what has since been referred to as the “two hats”
principle:
1) The PBA clearly distinguishes between the role of an employer and the
role of an administrator in respect of a pension plan.85
2) The PBA expressly permits an employer to play both roles even though
the “two roles may come into conflict from time to time.”86
3) An act of an employer-administrator its capacity as employer does not
violate the conflicts-of-interest prohibition in s. 22(4).87
Essentially, the third proposition states that an employer-administrator is
subject to the statutory and common law fiduciary duties when it acts in a capacity

Kaplan and Frazer, supra note 53.
Imperial Oil Ltd v Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions) (1995), 18 CCPB 198 [Imperial Oil].
84 Ibid at paras 13-14.
85 Ibid at para 29.
86 Ibid at para 30.
87 Ibid at paras 33-36.
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qua administrator, but not when it acts qua employer.88 This reflects the underlying
public policy consideration in favour of allowing employers to make certain
decisions to its own advantage, rather than in the best interests of the
employees.89 It follows that the “two hats” principle recognizes the tension that
exists between ss. 8(1)(a) and 22(1)(4), and attempts to resolve it by limiting the
scope of the acts of employer-administrators to which the fiduciary duty, and the
conflict-of-interest prohibition in particular, extend.
The Indalex case gave the SCC its first opportunity to opine on the validity
of the “two hats” principle. Justice Deschamps, who penned the reasons for the
judgment, was patently critical of it. In her view, the conflict-of-interest
prohibition imposed on an employer-administrator should not be predicated on
whether the impugned act or decision “can be classified as being related to either
the management of the corporation or the administration of the pension plan.”90
She found such a classification unhelpful, because even a sound management
decision of the employer could have harmful consequences for the plan members.
By contrast, Justice Cromwell did not explicitly comment on the “two hats”
principle. His written reasons nevertheless suggest that he supported the rationale
behind the principle. Specifically, he observed that the dual role of an employeradministrator is expressly authorized by the PBA and is therefore “an important
aspect of the legal context for Indalex’s fiduciary duties as a plan administrator.”91
To this he added:
The broader business interests of the employer corporation and the
interests of pension beneficiaries in getting the promised benefits are
almost always at least potentially in conflict.92
Therefore, the fact that an act or a decision of the corporation qua
employer has a potential impact on the plan members’ interests does
not, in and of itself, constitute a breach of the corporation’s fiduciary
duty qua administrator.93

Kaplan and Frazer, supra note 53 at 327.
Imperial Oil, supra note 83 at para 33.
90 Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 65.
91 Ibid at para 193.
92 Ibid at para 198.
93 Ibid at paras 198-199.
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Justice Deschamps was not unaware of s. 8(1)(a) of the PBA. However,
unlike Justice Cromwell, she interpreted the provision to be indicative of the
legislature’s view that not all corporate functions of employer-administrator are
necessarily in conflict with its duties to the plan members.94 But where a conflict
does arise, s.22(4) obliges the employer-administrator to resolve the conflict in a
manner that preserves and protects the plan members’ interests.95 The difference
of opinion between Justice Deschamps and Justice Cromwell may be
summarized, without too great a loss of subtlety, as follows: Justice Deschamps
held an employer-administrator to the same conflict-of-interest prohibition that
other fiduciaries recognized by law are subject to, whereas Justice Cromwell
would subject an employer-administrator to a conflict-of-interest prohibition that
would be modified in light of its statutorily authorized dual role. Justice Cromwell
modified the conflict-of-interest prohibition by adding two qualifiers to the
definition of a conflict of interest in respect of an employer-administrator:
[A] situation of conflict of interest occurs when there is a substantial
risk that the employer-administrator’s representation of the plan
beneficiaries would be materially and adversely affected by the
employer-administrator’s duties to the corporation [emphasis added].96

Together, these two qualifiers raise the conflict-of-interest prohibition
applicable to an employer-administrator above the common law no-conflict rule
applicable to fiduciaries.

The question of whether Indalex breached its fiduciary obligation turned on
two interrelated legal issues: (1) whether Indalex found itself in a conflict
situation, and (2) whether Indalex responded to the situation in accordance with
its fiduciary duty.
Ibid at para 65.
Ibid.
96 Ibid at para 201.
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Despite their divergent views of the application of the conflict-ofprohibition to an employer-administrator, Justices Deschamps and Cromwell
agreed that a conflict arose when Indalex filed the DIP motion. In Justice
Cromwell’s view, his modified version of the conflict-of-interest prohibition was
triggered because the super-priority charge sought by Indalex in favour of the
DIP lenders “could easily have the effect of making it impossible for Indalex to
satisfy its funding obligations to the plan beneficiaries.”97 The fact that Justices
Cromwell and Deschamps reached the same conclusion in the result was viewed
by some insolvency lawyers as a clear message to employer-administrators that
they must be cognizant of their fiduciary duties to pension plan beneficiaries and
take active steps to protect and preserve the interest of these plan members, even
in insolvency.98
Justice Deschamps and Justice Cromwell agreed that Indalex failed to fulfil
its fiduciary duty. According to Justice Deschamps, Indalex should have either
given the plan members notice of the DIP motion so as to give them the
opportunity to present their arguments against the motion, or found a
replacement administrator or representative counsel to resolve the conflict.99
Justice Cromwell reasoned that Indalex should have brought the conflict of
interest to the attention of the CCAA judge, who would be “well placed” to make
discretionary decisions on “how best to ensure that the interests of the plan
beneficiaries are fully represented” in the CCAA proceedings.100 The key
takeaway here is not the difference between measures of conflict resolution
favoured by the justices, but rather the common proposition underlying them:
there are steps short of abandoning its corporate restructuring under the CCAA
that Indalex could have taken to properly address the conflict.
That holding attracted criticism from some scholars of fiduciary law;
Professor Ronald Davis, for instance, argues that it is irreconcilable with the

Ibid at para 214.
Brian Empey and Jesse Mighton, “After Indalex: A Guide to Changes in Canada’s Commercial Landscape”,
in Janis Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2013 (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2014) 109 at 132.
99 Ibid at paras 66, 73.
100 Ibid at para 217.
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existing common law with respect to fiduciary duty.101 The “long-standing, settled
doctrine” of fiduciary law prohibits a fiduciary facing a conflict between its own
interests and its fiduciary duty from terminating the fiduciary relationship in order
to pursue her interests. Applying this doctrine to the facts of the Indalex case,
argues Professor Davis, the SCC should have concluded that Indalex was strictly
prohibited from acting in self-interest—namely, pursuing restructuring under the
CCAA—when it conflicted with its fiduciary duty to the pension plan
members.102 In practical terms, this means that Indalex would have been obliged
to refuse to give its DIP lender super-priority over the pension plan members’
claims, or to negotiate a going-concern sale that was conditioned upon the
purchaser’s assuming the pension liabilities. As Indalex did not take any such
steps, Professor Davis thinks the SCC should have found Indalex breached its
fiduciary duty and, as an equitable remedy for such breach, imposed a
constructive trust on the proceeds from the going-concern sale of assets in favour
of the pension plan members.103 Yet, as discussed above, the SCC did not order
an equitable remedy based on constructive trust; rather, it held that Indalex could
have addressed the conflict by either giving the pension plan members notice of
the DIP motion, or alternatively finding a replacement administrator or
representative counsel to resolve the conflict. Professor Davis interprets the
majority’s holding as tantamount to giving Indalex permission to retire from its
fiduciary duty for the purpose of pursuing its self-interest.
Professor Davis further argues that the Court’s crucial error was
characterizing the conflict facing Indalex, not as a conflict between its self-interest
and its fiduciary duty as plan administrator (i.e. a conflict of interest and duty),
but rather as one between the fiduciary duty as plan administrator and the duty
to act in the best interests of the corporation as required by corporate law (i.e. a
conflict of duties).104 This difference in characterization is important, Professor
Ronald B. Davis, “Re Indalex: Fiduciary Duty = Conflict Management or Conflict Avoidance?”, in Janis
Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2013 (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2014) 69 at 96.
102 Ibid at 83-86.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
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Davis points out, because “the law offers different avenues for the fulfillment of
the obligations of the two different types of fiduciary conflict in certain
circumstances.”105 The law treats a conflict of duties as amenable to resolution
through the fiduciary’s withdrawal from one of the duties, while a fiduciary facing
a conflict of interest and duty is prohibited from continuing to act in selfinterest.106 In Professor Davis’s view, this mischaracterization played a critical role
in shaping the SCC’s incorrect view on the lengths to which Indalex must go in
an insolvency process to fulfill its fiduciary duty to the pension plan members.
He concludes his article with a stinging rebuke directed at the SCC: “the majority
decision in Sun Indalex Finance has stretched fiduciary doctrine so thin that it is
almost unrecognizable.”107
Professor Davis’s criticism is thought-provoking but ultimately flawed. He
correctly points out that Indalex, as a corporation, is a separate legal person from
Indalex’s board of directors. This means that the fiduciary obligations owed by
Indalex as plan administrator are not binding on the directors personally, unless
exceptional circumstances exist that warrant the piercing of the corporate veil.108
Conversely, the duty imposed by the corporate statute on Indalex’s directors to
act in the best interests of the corporation is not a duty assumed by Indalex.
Professor Davis is also correct that the ONCA’s decision in Indalex contains
statements that demonstrate the ONCA conflated Indalex’s fiduciary duty to the
pension plan members with the fiduciary duty owed by Indalex’s directors to the
corporation.109 However, the SCC majority did not make any similar statements.
Indeed, Professor Davis himself admits, “It is clear from the language used in the
SCC majority’s reasons there was a formal recognition that the situation facing
Indalex involved a conflict between its interests and duty, not a conflict of
duties”.110 This diminishes the credibility of Professor Davis’s argument that the
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107 Ibid at 107.
108 Ibid at 81.
109 Indalex (ONCA) supra note 46 at paras 140-42.
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ONCA’s mischaracterization was adopted by the SCC and “played a critical role
in that result.”111
More significant, Professor Davis’s entire article rests on a questionable
assumption that the facts of Indalex call for a simple, straightforward application
of traditional principles of fiduciary duty at common law, developed mainly from
cases concerning solicitor-client relations or corporate fiduciaries’ taking of
corporate opportunities for personal gains. The Indalex case differed from these
cases in that the conflict situation facing Indalex was engendered by its statutorily
authorized dual role as employer-administrator. To address this unique fact
situation, the majority of the SCC ascertained the nature and scope of Indalex’s
fiduciary duty having regard to the legal framework in which the corporation
acted as a fiduciary. One part of that legal framework was the Ontario PBA, which
authorized the dual role of employer-administrator – and its attendant potential
for conflict, if you agree with Justice Cromwell. The other part of that legal
framework was the CCAA, as the particular context in which the actual conflict
of interest facing Indalex arose. The CCAA proceedings had neither the purpose
nor the effect of extinguishing Indalex’s pension obligations.112 Rather, an initial
order granted by the CCAA judge operated only to “freeze”113 the rights of
pension beneficiaries and other creditors of Indalex alike in order to “preserv[e]
the status quo for the benefit of all stakeholders.”114 This is why neither Justice
Deschamps nor Justice Cromwell viewed Indalex’s decision to commence CCAA
proceedings as being on its own a breach of its fiduciary obligation to avoid
conflict of interests. Both Justices showed empathy for the serious financial
difficulty confronting Indalex. For this same reason, it is overly simplistic and
disingenuous to characterize, as Professor Davis does, Indalex’s quest for a
solution to its insolvency under the CCAA as no more than a corporate
fiduciary’s attempt to pursue its own interests at the expense of the plan
beneficiaries to whom it owes fiduciary obligations. Thus, as the above analysis
Ibid at 86.
Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 206.
113 Ibid at para 71.
114 Ibid at para 206.
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shows, it is incorrect to characterize this case as one to be decided strictly in
accordance with the common law governing fiduciaries.

So far this paper has analyzed and critiqued the SCC’s handling of two major
legal issues in the Indalex case: the priority treatment of PBA deemed trusts under
the CCAA, and the fiduciary duties of an employer-administrator in the course
of the CCAA proceedings. Though the SCC approached the PBA deemed trust’s
priority under the CCAA and Indalex’s fiduciary duty as two separate issues, these
are actually interrelated. The SCC’s handling of these two issues in Indalex creates
a legal contradiction for employer-administrators that are in or near insolvency.
Recall that, as discussed in Section III, the SCC in Indalex found that
priorities created by provincial statutes, including the PBA deemed trust, remain
effective in CCAA proceedings, subject to the doctrine of federal paramountcy.
The Court also held that no deemed trust could arise under s. 57(4) of the PBA
in the case of a pension plan—such as Indalex’s executive plan—that had not
been wound up when the proceedings under the CCAA were initiated.115 These
two holdings combine to produce a crucial implication: where a pension plan has
a wind-up deficiency, that wind-up deficiency will not be deemed to be held in
trust in favour of the plan beneficiaries under s. 57(4) of the PBA when the
employer seeks the CCAA protection unless the plan is wound up before the
commencement of the CCAA proceedings. Post-Indalex, any employeradministrator that is aware of this implication can entirely avoid liability for the
wind-up deficiency by not winding up its pension plan voluntarily prior to seeking
relief under the CCAA. As soon as the corporation obtains an initial order under
the CCAA, if it has not previously wound up the pension plan, then the
beneficiaries’ claim to the wind-up deficiency loses the benefit of the PBA
deemed trust. Instead, it is treated as an unsecured claim under the CCAA. Such
an outcome clearly prejudices the interests of the plan beneficiaries.
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The question of whether an employer-administrator’s decision to
deliberately avoid winding up its pension plan before commencing the CCAA
proceedings amounts to a breach of its fiduciary duty to the plan beneficiaries
remains unresolved. The SCC in Indalex did not offer any coherent guidance on
this question. On the one hand, the employer’s act arguably triggers the conflictof-interest prohibition—even the higher threshold favoured by Justice
Cromwell—because the loss of the PBA deemed trust “materially and adversely
affect[s]”116 the plan members’ interest. On the other hand, the majority of the
SCC in Indalex stated that a corporation’s decision to seek protection under the
CCAA is not itself a breach of its fiduciary duty as administrator. A stay of
proceedings granted under the CCAA does not extinguish the employer’s
pension obligations;117 rather, it “freezes”118 the rights of the plan members and
creditors alike in order to “preserv[e] the status quo for the benefit of all
stakeholders.”119 This is why neither Justice Deschamps nor Justice Cromwell
viewed Indalex’s decision to commence proceedings under the CCAA alone as a
breach of its fiduciary obligation to avoid conflict of interests. Moreover, where
the employer initiates proceedings under the CCAA with the intent of
restructuring (as opposed to effecting a liquidation), the employer generally will
not wind up the plan prior to the filing. Instead, the employer will retain its
employees and allow their benefits under the pension plan to continue accruing
after the employer initiates insolvency proceedings. If the pension plan is
incorporated into a collective agreement, the employer may well lack any
authority to wind up the plan unilaterally. A legal contradiction thus emerges. In
affirming the priority of the PBA deemed trust under the CCAA, the SCC
inadvertently brought the interests of the pension plan members into conflict
with the employer-administrator’s self-interest in pursuing a course of action for
purposes of corporate restructuring; the Court emphatically declared that course
of action not to be a breach of fiduciary duty.
Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 201.
Ibid at para 206.
118 Ibid at para 71.
119 Ibid at para 206.
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To resolve this contradiction, one must look outside the confines of
fiduciary law. One solution is regulatory oversight. An employer-administrator is
statutorily obligated to ensure that the pension plan and fund are administered in
accordance with the PBA and the regulations.120 In particular, s. 68(6) authorizes
the Superintendent of Financial Services to change the effective date of a wind
up by order.121 In theory, the Superintendent could change the effective date to a
date preceding the employer-administrator’s filling under the CCAA so as to
preserve the plan members’ claim for a PBA deemed trust in respect of any windup deficiencies. However, one of the current policies of the Financial Services
Commission of Ontario (FSCO) confines the effective date of a wind up to no
earlier than the date of the specific event that triggers the wind up, such as
insolvency.122 Therefore, the FSCO’s policy should be amended to allow the
Superintendent to exercise her authority under s. 68(6) for the benefit of the plan
members.

The insolvency of a business that sponsors pension plans for its employees
presents a scenario layered with complexities. As Justice Cromwell puts it,
“Pension plans and creditors find themselves in a zero-sum game with not
enough money to go around.”123 In an attempt to preserve and protect the rights
of vulnerable pension plan members, the SCC declared the deemed trust
provisions in the PBA to be generally effective under the CCAA, subject to
certain exceptions. Though well-intentioned, this holding creates an inconsistency
between Canada’s two federal insolvency regimes, raising the spectre of statute
shopping as well as diminishing the coherence of the case law. On the second
issue of Indalex’s fiduciary duty, the majority appeared divided on the validity of
the “two hats” principle, but nevertheless agreed that Indalex’s failure to take
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active steps to properly resolve the conflict violated the conflict of interest
prohibition.
The interplay between the SCC’s holdings on these two issues, while not
explicitly considered by the Court, has in fact created a legal contradiction that
seemingly cannot be resolved using the existing jurisprudence on either the
CCAA priorities or the fiduciary duty of the employer-administrator. This
indicates an unmistakable need for Parliament and provincial legislatures to
provide courts with clearer guidance, and they should seize the opportunity to
properly balance the interests of pension plan beneficiaries and other
stakeholders.

